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1 Introduction: the Dutch debate on access to justice
'Access to justice' has long been neglected as a potential subject for
discussion in the Netherlands. With regard to criminal law and civil law, the
independent and impartial administration of justice was provided for by
virtue of the Constitution and 'organic' laws (laws which are required by the
Constitution and which govern the/organization of the State), amongst other
things. The guarantees provided by Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights/hereinafter ECHR) were considered to be amply available in
the Dutch legal order. With regard to administrative law, for reasons of
principle no choice had been specifically made at the end of the last century
for the administration ofjustice. For a long time there were several different
forms of independent administration ofjustice (mostly special administrative
courts) and ofappeal to a higher administrative body (administratiejberoep),
such as the Council of State and the provincial executive on a decentralized
level, and the Crown on the central level. 1 Influenced by the case-law of the
European Court of Human Rights, in the mid-eighties a debate developed in
the Netherlands concerning the realization of access to justice. This debate
1. See J. van der Hoeven, De drie dimensies van het bestuursrecht; ontstaan en vonning van
het Nederlands algemeen bestuursrecht [Three Dimensions of Administrative Law; the
Origins and Development ofGeneral Administrative Law in the Netherlands], VAR Series
100, Alphen aid Rijn, 1989; E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, Het grondrecht op behoorlijke
rechtspraak in het Nederlandse administratieve recht [The fundamental right to the proper
administration ofjustice in Dutch Administrative Law], Handelingen NJV 1983, Zwolle,
1983.
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started as a result of the Benthem case." Although discussion about the
desirability of administratief beroep in administrative cases had already
commenced shortly before this decision, it made clear that the Dutch
approach to the administration ofjustice in administrative cases was at odds
with the right of access to justice as laid down in Article 6 ECHR.3
Ultimately these developments led to the introduction of a general
procedure for the administration ofjustice in relation to administrative cases
by means of the General Administrative Law Act (hereinafter GALA) in
1994; the abolition of the administratief beroep as an alternative to the
administration of justice by administrative courts became a fact. With this,
the debate on the realization of legal protection against administrative bodies
came to an end, after well over a century of discussion.
The right of access to justice has not been laid down as a constitutional right
as such. The Dutch legal order also does not provide for constitutional
review. Both factors contribute to the absence from case-law of the right of
access to justice. During the course of this century the ordinary courts
assumedjurisdiction in cases against the administration on the ground of tort
law and claims such as undue payment. This case-law finally laid the
foundations for a system on the basis of which everyone has access to the
ordinary courts in order to resolve a dispute involving the administration
and/or administrative action, unless an equally effective special judicial
process supported by sufficient safeguards exists.' The relationship between
the civil courts' jurisdiction and the competence of the administrative courts
still needs to be decided upon by the Supreme Court.
In recent years the debate about access to justice has also led to discussions
on the accessibility ofjustice and the administration ofjustice having regard
to the costs involved. During the 1960s the issue of the costs of legal
assistance by lawyers was a subject of heated discussion. This resulted in the
creation of law polyclinics,' as an extension of which the so-called sociale-
2....European Court of Human Rights, 23 October 1985, Benthem v. The Netherlands, Series
A, vol. 97, NJ 1986, 102.
3. G.J. Wiarda, De betekenis van art. 6, lid 1 van het Europees Verdrag tot beschenning van
de Rechten van de Mens, voor de Nederlandse administratieve rechtsgangen [The
Significance of Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights to the
Administration of Justice in Dutch Administrative Law in: Non sine causa, Opstellen
aangeboden aan Prof. mr. G.J. Scholten, Zwolle, 1979, p. 459-474.
4. Supreme Court, 28 February 1992, AB 1992, 301, (Changoe/Staat).
5. Legal advice centre for the indigent and people of limited means, run by students under
the supervision of university staff.
f\CCESS TO JUSTICE AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN THE DUTCH LEGAL ORDER 397
advocatuur (literally, the 'social bar', i.e., legal-aid lawyers) developed." In
the 1990s the government cut the legal-aid budget, resulting in the disappear-
ance of the sociale advocatuur. In addition, the length and costs of procee-
dings have increasingly become the subject of debate. In criminal procedural
law, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on 'undue delay'
has led to the acceleration of proceedings. In civil procedure, experiments are
being conducted with more expeditious proceedings, and the case-law of the
Supreme Court is characterized by a tendency to deformalize. Alternative
Dispute Resolution is also receiving increasing interest.'
In legal practice, interim injunction proceedings playa significant part in
civil proceedings and pre-trial remedies in administrative cases. With respect
to time, subject matter and available remedies, civil courts have given a wide
interpretation to their jurisdiction in interim injunction proceedings. The
result is that the collection of debts often takes place by means of interim
injunction proceedings and fundamental points of law can be brought before
the courts within a relatively short time.
This has been a comparatively short introduction to the Dutch debate on
access to justice. In this article there will be a further examination of the
following subjects: the formal basis of the right of access to justice in the
Dutch legal order (§ 2) and the substantial difficulties in its realization (§ 3).
The article will end with a conclusion (§ 4).
2 Formal protection of the right of access to justice
2.1 Protection by the Dutch Constltution
Article 15 (2) of the Dutch Constitution reads:
,Anyone who has been deprived of his liberty other than by order of a court may
request a court to order his release. In such a case he shall be heard by the court
within a period to be laid down by Act of Parliament. The court shall order his
immediate release if it considers the deprivation of liberty to be unlawful'.
6. J.C. Houtappel, Access to justice in Holland, A summary, in: M. Cappelletti & B. Garth
(eds), Access to justice, Vol. I, A world survey, Book II, Leiden 1978, p. 581-594; P.J.
Verberne, Leemte in de rechtshulp blijft nog even [The lacuna in Legal Aid Advice will
remain in the near future], Proces 1975, p. 122-125.
7. See NJ.H. Huls, M.A. Kleiboer & HJ. de Kluiver (eds), Alternatieve wegen naar het recht
[Alternative Ways to Justice], Nijmegen, 1997.
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This provision, the principle of habeas corpus, finds its counterpart in Article
5 (4) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 9
(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Article 17 of the Dutch Constitution reads:
'No one may be prevented against his will from being heard by the courts to
which he is entitled to apply under the law'.
This so-called ius de non evocando was adopted in 1983 in Chapter 1 of the
Constitution, which deals with fundamental rights. Before 1983 this provision
had been placed in the Chapter on the judiciary. Article 17 contains a
negatively formulated guarantee of access to justice."
Some authors have argued for a restrictive interpretation of Article 17,9
but a stand against this narrow approach can be found in the recognition of
this right as a fundamental right by the constitutional legislator in 1983, when
it was placed in Chapter 1 of the Constitution.'?
The meaning of Article 17 was discussed on the occasion of the approval
by Parliament of the Eems-Dollard Treaty between the Netherlands and
Germany. The result of this treaty was that in certain circumstances interested
parties could no longer rely on access to relevant procedures, partly because
German administrative law does not provide for access to the courts for
interested Dutch parties. The outcome of these parliamentary debates appears
to be that Article 17, unlike Article 6 ECHR, does not contain the right of
access to a court. Article 17 requires that existing access to the courts must
not be frustrated. 11
Article 17 provides a guarantee against the executive power and the
ordinary legislator, not against the formal legislator (the Government and
Parliament introducing Acts of Parliament). Restricting access to the courts
by the formal legislator is not forbidden by Article 17.12
8. See A.F.M. Brenninkmeijer, De toegang tot de rechter [Access to court], dissertation
Tilburg, Zwolle 1987, p. 71. See also Hirsch Ballin 1983, p. 18.
9. See Van der Pot/Donner/Prakke, Handboek van het Nederlandse staatsrecht [Guide to
Dutch Constitutional Law], Zwolle, 1995, p. 315.
10. See Brenninkmeijer 1987, p. 73.
11. See A.W. Heringa and T. Zwart, De Nederlandse Grondwet [The Dutch Constitution],
Zwolle 1991, p. 77.
12. See Tj. Gerbranda & M. Kroes, Grondrechten-Evaluatie-Onderzoek [Evaluational
Research into the Application in Practice of the Constitutional Rights in the 1983
Constitution], Documentatierapport (4), 1991, aant 17-15.
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Article 18 of the Constitution reads:
, 1. Everyone may be legally represented in legal and administrative proceedings.
2. Rules concerning the granting of legal aid to persons of limited means shall be
laid down by Act of Parliament' .
The right to legal aid is a fundamental right with classical (see paragraph 1)
and social elements (see paragraph 2). Article 18 (1) is only applicable in
court proceedings. .
The guarantee provided by Article 18 (2) has been elaborated in the Legal
Aid Act 1993 (Wet op de Rechtsbijstand). Persons under a certain income
have the right to legal aid according to this act. Depending on their income,
they must pay a so-called eigen bijdrage (personal contribution) for the legal
aid. The legal aid is free when the court, according to a legal provision
(mainly in the field of criminal law), assigns a lawyer to the person
concerned.
Article 112 of the Constitution reads:
, I. The adjudication of disputes involving rights under civil law and debts shall
be the responsibility of the judiciary.
2. Responsibility for the adjudication of disputes which do not arise from matters
of civil law may be granted by Act of Parliament either to the judiciary or to
courts that do not form part of the Judiciary. The method of dealing with such
cases and the consequences of decisions shall be regulated by Act of Parliament' .
This Article has been placed in Chapter 6 of the Constitution, which deals
with the judiciary. It does not contain a subjective right of access to a court.
Article 113 (1) and (3) of the Constitution read:
'I. The trial of offences shall also be the responsibility of the judiciary. (...)
3. A sentence entailing deprivation of liberty may be imposed only by the
judiciary' .
The conclusion must be that the Dutch Constitution does not provide for a
subjective right of access to a court, except for the person who has been
deprived of his liberty other than by court order.
2.2 Protection by treaty provisions
The subjective right of access to a court is protected by international treaties
to which the Netherlands is a party. It is protected in particular by Articles
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5 (4), 6 (1) and 13 ECHR and Article 14 ICCPR. On the basis of Articles 93
and 94 of the Constitution these provisions form part of Dutch law, and they
can be invoked by citizens before the courts as far as these provisions are
'self-executing'. Article 6 ECHR especially has proved to be very important
for access to justice in the Netherlands. However, Article 6 is- not self-
executing in as far as the creation of a new competence of the judiciary is
concerned." Article 6 (1) provides:
'In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part
of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the
private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion ofthe court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice'.
In its early case-law the European Court of Human Rights decided that the
right of access to a court is contained in Article 6, although the text of this
provision is not explicit on this point. 14 According to the Court, restrictions
can be imposed on access to a court but these restrictions may not impair the
essence of the right of access to a court. IS This right must also be effective
according to the judgment in Airey v. Ireland. Ms. Airey wanted to divorce
her violent husband. However, she was factually not able to commence court
proceedings because of the fact that she did not have enough legal knowledge
to litigate. As she did not have sufficient means to pay for a lawyer and there
was no legal aid available, she did not have effective access to justice. The
European Court found that a violation of Article 6 (1) had occurred. 16
The Strasbourg case-law on Article 6 ECHR has largely influenced the
access to justice in Dutch law. The Dutch legal system had, apart from
particular courts dealing with administrative disputes, a long tradition of
appeal to a higher administrative body instead of the judiciary. This appeal
concerned environmental permits, local plans, compulsory military service
13. Supreme Court, 18 February 1986, NJ 1987, 62 and Supreme Court, 30 January 1996,
NJ 1996, 288.
14. European Court ofHuman Rights, 21 February 1975, Golder v. United Kingdom, Series
A, vol. 18, NJ 1975, 462.
15. European Court of Human Rights, 24 October 1979, Winterwerp v. The Netherlands,
Series A, vol. 33, NJ 1980, 114.
16. European Court of Human Rights, 9 October 1979, Airey v. Ireland, Series A, vol. 32,
NJ 1980, 376.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT IN THE DUTCH LEGAL ORDER 401
matters and social security. In the Netherlands, unlike Germany, for reasons
of principle no choice had been specifically made in favour of the judiciary.
During the course of this century, the legal protection of citizens against the
government was formed partly on the basis of tradition and partly on the
basis ofpragmatic considerations. Appeal to a higher administrative body was
considered an alternative of full value for the independent judiciary. The
European Court's Benthem judgment in 1985 shook this Dutch conception of
legal protection against the government. After a temporary provision in order
to adhere to this Strasbourg judgment, in 1994 the Netherlands finally
adopted a system of general protection by the courts against the administra-
tion.
Also relevant for access to the courts is the fact that the Netherlands is a
member of the European Union. In the field covered by Community law, the
European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) requires an 'effective judicial
control' or an 'effective appeal to a competent court' at the national level.
This so-called principle of 'effective legal protection' is, in the opinion of the
ECJ, the foundation of the common constitutional heritage of the Member
States, and is also based on Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.17 The ECJ even gives,
under certain circumstances, precedence to the principle of effective legal
protection at the expense of national constitutional principles, such as the
separation of powers and the sovereignty of parliament. As more and more
fields are covered by Community law, the significance of this ECJ case-law
is also increasing for the Netherlands."
An interesting consequence of Community law is the application of this
law by the courts ex officio. This question has been partly clarified by the
17. ECJ, 15 May 1986, Johnston (222/84), ECR 1986 (1:651), § 18. See also the ECJ case,
15 October 1987, Heylens e.a. (222/86), ECR 1987 (4097), § 11. Compare, for the role
of national judges in the implementation of community law, S. Prechal, Directives in
European Community law, A study on EC directives and their enforcement by national
courts, dissertation University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1995, mainly p. 145-187.
18. Compare the reports for the Vereniging voor Administratief Recht [Association for
Administrative Law] ofE. Steyger, RJ.G.M. Widdershoven and A.W.H. Meij, Europees
recht en het Nederlands bestuursrecht [European Law and Dutch Administrative Law],
VAR Series 116, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1996. See also W. van Gerven, Bridging the gap
between community and national laws: towards a principle of homogeneity in the field
of legal remedies?, Common Market Law Review 1995, p. 679-702; R. Caranta, Judicial
protection against member states: a newjus commune takes shape, Common Market Law
Review 1995, p. 703-726. See also R. de Lange & R. Widdershoven, Niederlande [The
Netherlands], in: J. Schwarze (Hrsgb.), Das Verwaltungsrecht unter europaischem
. Einfluss, Baden-Baden, 1996.
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judgments In the cases of Van Schijndel,'" Peterbroeck" and Kraaije-
veld 21
2.3 Protection by statute
The right of access to a court has been elaborated in so-called 'organic laws'.
This mainly concerns the Code-of Civil Procedure, the Code of Criminal
Procedure and the GALA. With regard to legal protection against the
government, a very important fact is that the courts in civil matters have a
very broad perspective of competence, dating from a judgment of 1915:
whenever the applicant requests protection as regards a civil right against the
government, the civil courts are deemed competent to deal with the case."
Thanks to this wide competence of the civil courts, the right of access to
a court in disputes with the government is formally not a problem. Since
1994, with the entry into force of the GALA, the practical significance of
this wide competence of the civil courts has diminished. The conclusion must
be that the general administrative law and the civil courts together provide
general access to justice in disputes with the government.
In administrative disputes the scope of judicial control is restricted to
'orders'. According to Article 1:3 GALA, an order means a written ruling of
an administrative authority constituting a judicial act under public law. The
majority of these orders are decisions, which are orders not of a general
nature, directed against individual persons. The GALA is not applicable to
Acts of Parliament. The general administrative court is competent vis-a-vis
decisions, with the exception of an order containing a generally binding
regulation or a policy rule. In 1994, upon the entry into force of the GALA,
there was provision for an extension of appeal against these rules in 1999.
However, it is likely that this extension will be delayed." The effect of this
delay is restricted. Firstly, indirect appeal against generally binding
regulations or policy rules is always possible. Secondly, the civil courts deal
with direct appeals against these rules. The civil courts are deemed competent
19. ECJ, 14 February 1995, ECR 1995 1-4705, joint cases C-430/93 and C-431/93.
20. ECJ, 14 February 1995, ECR 1995 1-4599, case C-312/93.
21. ECJ, 24 October 1996, ECR 1996 1-5403, zaak C-72/95.
22. Supreme Court, 31 December 1915, NJ 1916, 407 (Guldemond/Noordwijkerhout).
23. See the note by the Minister of Justice, offered to Parliament by letter of 13 May 1997,
TK 1996-1997, 25383, no. 1. See for criticism of this delay, J.E.M. Polak, Rechtstreeks
beroep tegen algemeen verbindende voorschriften en beleidsregels bij de bestuursrechter:
voorlopig van de baan? [Direct appeal to the administrative courts against generally
binding regulations and policy rules: provisionally cancelled"], Trema 1997, p, 269-272.
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to consider these disputes with the government within the bounds of an
unlawful act by the government according to Article 6:162 of the Civil Code
(onrechtmatige overheidsdaadi.
3 Substantial difficulties in the realization of the right of access
to justice
3.1 Scope ofjudicia/review
In deciding a dispute at hand, Dutch courts can review a case for conformity
with basically all legal norms. Treaties and resolutions of international
institutions are at the top of the Dutch hierarchy of legislation. These are
followed by the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands," the Constitu-
tion, Acts ofParliament, Orders in Council, ministerial regulations, provincial
bye-laws and municipal bye-laws. The fundamental legal principles which are
partly codified as general principles .of proper administration in the GALA
form a separate category of norms in the light of which Dutch courts can
review a case.
A limitation of the scope of judicial review concerns Acts of Parliament.
Article 120 of the Constitution denies a court the authority to review the
contents and the method of the coming into being of Acts of Parliament for
conformity with the Constitution (which lists, among other things, a
catalogue of fundamental rights and freedoms) and the fundamental legal
principles. Dutch courts are also precluded from reviewing Acts of Parlia-
ment by reference to the Charter of the Kingdom." Review of this kind has
been exclusively reserved for the formal legislator (joint exercise of
legislative power by the government and Parliament). This prohibition of
judicial review has been dictated by the separation of powers doctrine. The
elected legislator's will should prevail over the will ofthe non-democratically
legitimized courts." The judiciary should be prevented from occupying the
legislator's chair. An exception to the prohibition of judicial review to test
conformity with fundamental legal principles will only be likely to occur if
strict application of the Act would have (legal) consequences which have not
been taken into account when drafting the Act and which are contrary to
24. Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the Netherlands, the Netherlands
Antilles and Aruba).
25. See Supreme Court, 14April 1989, NJ 1989,469 (Hannonisatiewet); Supreme Court, 27
January 1961, NJ 1963, 248 (Van den Bergh/Staat; prohibition of procedural review).
26. See Article 11 Act on General Provisions concerning Legislation.
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these principles." Dutch courts do have jurisdiction to review laws of a
lower order for conformity with the Constitution and fundamental legal
principles." The prohibition of judicial review is controversial. Several
attempts have been made to strike out Article 120 of the Constitution so as
to make possible the judicial review of Acts of Parliament to test their
conformity with the Constitution and fundamental legal principles."
In practice, however, the effects of the prohibition of judicial review as
laid down in Article 120 of the Constitution are limited. Acts of Parliament
are not unassailable for the courts. The reason for this is that according to
Articles 93 and 94 of the Constitution the Dutch courts are competent to
review Acts of Parliament in the light of self-executing provisions of treaties
and of binding resolutions of international organizations. If a court discovers
that such a provision has been violated it is even under a duty to deny
application to national law. In particular, judicial review to test conformity
with provisions of treaties on human rights, such as the ECHR and the
ICCPR, has evolved considerably, following a slow start, since 1980.30 As
a result of this review, Dutch courts have actively set aside national law in
many cases." In some cases, however, courts have left unanswered the
question whether there actually has been a violation of ECHR or ICCPR
provisions and have concluded that the legislator and not the courts should
come up with a solution, as this wouldgo far beyond the latter's traditional
role in the development of law. As a consequence, the parties involved were
sent home empty-handed. One could wonder whether such cases do not
27. Supreme Court, 14 April 1989, NJ 1989, 469 (Harmonisatiewet).
28. See Supreme Court, 16 May 1986, NJ 1987, 251 (Landbouwvliegers); Supreme Court,
17 October 1993, NJ 1994, 44 (Legesverordening Beerta).
29. See e.g. L. Prakke, T. Koopmans, J.M. Barendrecht, Toetsing [Judicial Review],
Handelingen NJV 1992, Zwolle, 1992; Op weg naar constitutiooele toetsing [Towards
Constitutional Review], Special issue NJCM-Bulletin, April 1992; M.L.P. van Houten,
Meer zicht op wetgeving [A better View on Legislation], dissertation Tilburg, Zwolle,
1997.
30. See e.g. E.A. Alkema, The effects of the European Convention 00 Human Rights and
other international human rights instruments on the Netherlands legal order, in: R. Lawson
& M. de Blois (eds), The dynamics of the European protection of human rights, Essays
in honour of Henry G. Schenners, DordrechtIBostonILondon, 1994, p. 1-14.
31. See e.g. Supreme Court, 17 September 1993, NJ 1994,373 and Judicial Division of the
Council of State, 16 June 1994, NJCM-Bulletin 1994, p. 981-988.
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constitute an instance of denial of justice" and whether one can still speak
of effective access to justice."
EC law also heavily influences the limitation of the scope of the
constitutional prohibition of judicial review. On the basis of the case-law of
the ECJ, national courts are under a duty to apply directly applicable
provisions of EC Law in their national legal order and to give priority to
these Community law provisions. This obligation implies that Article 120 of
the Constitution has lost its importance in relation to Community law."
A limitation of the scope of judicial review is also basically to be seen with
regard to the relationship between (administrative) courts and the administra-
tion. The legislator may award the administration discretionary freedom when
applying administrative powers. In such a case it is up to the administration
to decide whether and how to use its powers on the basis of balancing
interests. The basic assumption is that a court needs to respect such an
administrative balancing act, and that it should not replace the administrative
body's decision with its own. This reserved attitude of the judiciary has been
advocated (also) by appealing to the Trias Politica: the administration should
not be 'taken over' by the courts when it has explicitly been granted
discretionary freedom by the legislator. However, the administration does not
enjoy an absolute freedom in such cases, for the Dutch courts quite soon
developed the so-called arbitrariness test. In .1949 the Supreme Court decided
that:
' ...there could be reason to intervene, ifthe requisition [of living accommodation;
tb/afmb/mlve] was-to be viewed as an arbitrary act; that there is such an act as
must be assumed that the requisitioning authority could not have reasonably
decided to requisition considering the interests that had to be taken into account,
and therefore a weighing of these interests must be assumed not to have taken
place...'35
32. By virtue of Article 13 Act on General Provisions concerning Legislation, the Dutch
courts are under a duty to decide cases once they are brought before them.
33. See e.g. Supreme Court, 23 September 1988, NJ 1989, 740 and Supreme Court, 4
November 1994, NJ 1995,249 and Supreme Court, 5 September 1997, RvdW 1997, nr.
159C (Adoption by lesbian mothers).
34. ECJ, 5 February 1963, Van Gend en Loos (26/62), ECR\963 (3); ECJ, 15 July 1964,
CostalENEL (6/64), ECR 1964 (1199).
35. Supreme Court, 25 February 1949, NJ 1949, 558 (Doetinchem). On this subject see F.
Stroink, Judicial control of the administration's discretionary powers (Ie bilan executif
- juge administratif), in: A.W. Heringa et al. (eds), Judicial control, Comparative essays
on judicial review, AntwerpenlApeldoorn, 1995, p. 81-99 on p. 82.
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It follows that the arbitrariness test is concerned with a marginal judicial
review. This so-called prohibition of arbitrariness, among other things with
respect to the use of discretionary freedom, was later laid down in Article 8
(1) (c) of the Administrative Jurisdiction Administrative Decisions Act as a
'ground for appeal and judicial review'. In practice also, the impact of this
marginal review has been considerable, as it has been intensified over the
course oftime in the interest of the legal protection of the civilian against the
authorities. This finds expression in Article 3:4 (2) GALA, which replaces
the aforementionedArticle 8(1)(c) Administrative Jurisdiction Administrative
Decisions Act. Article 3:4 (2) GALA incorporates the principle of propor-
tionality: 'The disadvantages for one or more interested parties must not be
disproportionate to the ends which are to be served by the decision'. This
principle appears to offer the courts better prospects for reviewing administra-
tive action than the criterion of arbitrariness. The Judicial Division of the
Council of State, however, has stated that the scope of Article 3:4 GALA
will not be wider than the scope of the prohibition of arbitrariness as
developed in case-law in relation to the review of discretionary powers."
The review to test for conformity with the principle of proportionality will
only be of more significance when a review of (punitive) sanctions is
concerned." Yet in practice the courts have in recent years taken over more
and more administrative responsibilities." Criticism has not been lacking.
In particular, the legitimacy of such a judicial attitude has been identified as
problematic. Only recently the Dutch judiciary had to endure an attack from
members of the administration. The courts were said to be interfering too
much with the administration and thereby frustrating efficient government."
In view of the available instruments, it is not surprising that the Dutch courts
have managed to acquire a strong position compared with the legislator and
the administration. In this respect a part has also been played by the
judiciary's point of view that in order to protect civilians a counterbalance
needs to be made against the legislator and the administration, as the latter
two powers have started to intervene in more and more fields of society,
owing to the rise of the welfare state.40
36. Judicial Division Council of State, 9 May 1996, AB 1997, 93 (Maxis/Praxis).
37. Judicial Division Council of State, 4 June 1996, JB 1996, 172.
38. See Stroink 1995, p. 83-89.
39. See e.g. the special issue of the NTB 1997, no. 1 and of Justitiele Verkenningen 1997,
no. 5 with contributions from both 'sides'.
40. See e.g. T. Koopmans, De rol van de wetgever [The Role of the Legislator], in: Honderd
jaar rechtsleven, De Nederlandse Juristenvereniging 1870-1970, Zwolle, 1970.
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3.2 Right to appeal
The right of appeal, in the sense of proceedings in two instances, has not
been embedded in the Dutch Constitution.
However, the Seventh Protocol to the ECHR incorporates a right to appeal
in Article 2. Everyone convicted of a criminal offence' by a tribunal shall
have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher court,
although the second paragraph of Article 2 Seventh Protocol does allow for
exceptions to be laid down by law in relation to offences of.a minor
character and with respect to cases in which the person concerned was tried
in the first instance by the highest tribunal or was convicted following an
appeal against acquittal. The Seventh Protocol entered into force in 1989, but
has not been ratified by the Netherlands. Precisely the fact that the Protocol
incorporates a right to appeal in criminal cases appears to be one of the
factors behind the withholding of ratification. Given the vagueness of the
concepts implied by 'tribunal' and 'criminal' and the dynamic Strasbourg
case-law on the subject, which has not yet fully taken shape, opponents of
ratification fear an undesired extension of the right to appeal, to include a
number of extrajudicial impositions of sanctions (social security law,
disciplinary law). With regard to the judicial imposition of sanctions in
respect of the more serious offences, no problems appear to arise in the
Netherlands: in such cases a right to appeal is always provided for in
accordance with Article 2 Seventh Protocol."
The Netherlands is, however, bound by Article 14 (5) ICCPR, in which
a similar right to appeal in criminal cases is laid down: 'Everyone convicted
of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed
by a higher tribunal according to the law.' The words 'tribunal' and
'criminal' appear to be unambiguous in the context of the treaty: they refer
to the judicial imposition of sanctions."
Thus outside the field ofjudicial imposition of sanctions, no fundamental
right to appeal has been recognized in the Dutch legal order.
Nevertheless, generally speaking the possibility of appeal (hearings at two
instances) is allowed not only by criminal procedural law but also by civil
procedure and administrative procedural law.43
41. See C.w. Dubbink's recommendations to the Dutch government regarding the ratification
of the Seventh Protocol, NJCM-Bulletin 1995, p. 439-461.
42. See the aforementioned recommendations by C.W. Dubbink.
43. With respect to criminal procedure, see Articles 404-455 Code ofCriminal Procedure; on
civil procedure, see Articles 332-358 Code of Civil Procedure; on administrative
procedure, Article 37 Council of State Act and Article 18 Appeals Act.
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The legislator is, however, at liberty to deviate from this basic rule or to
attach conditions to the right to appeal. This has happened, for example, in
tax law. After the proceedings at first instance in the Tax Division of the
Court of Appeal, the only procedure remaining in such cases is often the
cassation procedure at the Supreme Court." However, this court does not
examine the factual circumstances of the case. The review of the Supreme
Court is confined to a review to test conformity with legal norms." A
similar system is now employed in relation to the hearing of less serious
traffic offences. In order to promote efficiency, the hearings of these cases
has been diverted from the criminal justice system to the administrative
justice system by the so-called Wet Mulder, simultaneously ruling out the
possibility of appeal." Article 56 (5) of the Judicial Organization Act has
also precluded appeal against the decisions of the District Court in relation
to a number of (less serious) offences. The cases have to concern persons
who at the time of the commencement of the prosecution have reached the
age of 18 years. In disputes concerning the dissolution of a contract of
employment, both appeal and cassation are basically excluded by virtue of
Article 7:685 (11) of the Civil Code." An exception to this rule will only
be accepted when the article has been wrongly applied, has unjustly not been
applied" or in the case of such a violation of fundamental legal principles
that the proceedings can no longer be qualified as fair and impartial.49
Furthermore, no appeal can be lodged in disputes in which the Subdistrict
Court has jurisdiction (civil cases, claims up to Dfl. 5,000) and when the
claim amounts to less than Dfl. 2,500.so Partly due to the absence of a
general right of appeal, when amending the Aliens Act in 1993 the Dutch
legislator was also able to abolish the right to appeal in cases governed by
this Act. Litigation in this field of law was said to take up too much time and
the possibility of abusing the right of appeal in order to prolong the stay was
44. See Article 71 Judicial Organization Act in connection with Article 26 General Tax Act
and the Administrative Jurisdiction in Tax Cases Act.
45. Article 99 Judicial Organization Act.
46. See Act on the Administrative Enforcement ofTraffic Regulations; for criticisms see M.
Viering & J. Fleuren, Onschuldpresumptie en recht op hoger beroep: twee grenzen aan
vereenvoudigde afdoening [The Presumption of Innocence and the Right to Appeal: Two
Limits to Simplified Settlement], NJB 1986, p. 416-464.
47. However, recent developments point towards the introduction of the right to appeal in
these cases (De Volkskrant, 24 October 1997).
48. Supreme Court, 12 March 1982, NJ 1983, 181.
49. For example, Supreme Court, 4 March 1988, NJ 1989, 4.
50. Article 38 Judicial Organization Act.
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also taken into account." This decision led to a great deal of criticism. Why
should aliens be denied the right to appeal in cases involving questions of
vital importance while in other cases, in which much lesser interests are at
stake, the right to appeal has been given as standard practice? As a result of
the aforementioned criticism, the Cabinet has now introduced a Bill which
proposes the partial reintroduction of appeal in cases concerning aliens.
Whether Parliament will eventually accept the Bill has to be awaited.52
3.3 Procedural elements relevant to the effectiveness of the right of
access to justice
3.3.1 Court registry fees
In the Netherlands, court registry fees differ enormously depending on the
kind of court proceedings in question. They can range from about Dfl, 50 to
several thousands of guilders.53 The government is free to restrict access to
justice by charging registry fees, provided that this does not impair the
essence of the right of access to a court.
The charging of registry fees with the aim of slowing down ill-considered
and malevolent appeals to the court satisfies the requirements of Article 6
ECHR. It is doubtful whether the charging of registry fees solely out of
budgetary motives is justified.54 A court registry fee which is too high can
form an impediment to access to justice in a concrete case.
In Article 8:41 GALA certain registry fees are fixed for groups of cases.
In some Gases, like social security, the registry fee is Dfl, 50, while in other
cases a fee of Dfl, 200 is required. In practice, this fee of Dfl. 200 is found
to be too high by many people. Article 8:41 GALA does not provide for the
possibility of mitigating the registry fee if the individual concerned is not
able to pay the total amount of the fee because of personal circumstances.55
However, in a judgment by the President ofa District Court the petitioner,
a legal person with environmental objectives, was not able to pay the court
registry fees (according to Article 8:41 GALA legal persons have to pay a
registry fee of Dfl, 400). The President was of the opinion that the payment
51. Article 33e Aliens Act in connection with Article 37 Council of State Act; Recommen-
dations by the Supreme Court with respect to migration cases of 14 March 1995, NJCM-
Bulletin 1995, pp. 606-615, annotation by A. Woltjer.
52. Stcrt. 171, Monday 8 September 1997; NJB 1997, p. 1575.
53. See C.C.W. Lange, De toegang tot de rechter in het geding [Access to the Courts under
discussion], NJB 1996, p. 1009-1016, on p. 1010.
54. Lange 1996, p.1012.
55. Lange 1996, p. 1009 and 1013.
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of this amount could not be required from this legal person, particularly la
view of Article 6 ECHR; otherwise rapid access to the courts would be
impossible. According to the President the petitioner had to pay only Dfl:
200.56
Furthermore, an additional impediment to the access to justice can arise
because of a cumulation of registry fees, if separate appeals must be made
against different parts of the same order." In this way the access to justice
can be hindered in an unacceptable way and the registry fees required can
violate Article 6 ECHR.
3.3.2 The requirement ofa procurator (litis)
Civil proceedings can be commenced by petition or by writ of summons. In
the procedure before the Subdistrict Courts these counts are competent to
deal with claims under Oft. 5,000) a form was introduced by way of
experiment, in order to give a party the opportunity to commence civil
proceedings without the assistance of a lawyer. However, this form was not
found to be a success, because the execution of judgments was often
problematic.
In civil proceedings before the Subdistrict Courts no procurator (litis) is
required. At the moment the system of requiring a procurator (litis) is under
review. One very important proposal is to raise the limit of the courts'
competence to Dfl, 25,000 guilders. The idea is that 90% of all claims
involve a smaller amount than this. Another proposal is to simplify civil
proceedings, so that the institution of proceedings without procedural
representation is possible.58
In criminal proceedings there is a system of legal aid by counsel. In
administrative proceedings there is, in principle, no obligatory procedural
representation.
3.3.3 Personal contribution and lawyersfees
Only some lawyers charge relatively low tariffs for their services, ranging
from Oft. 150 to Dfl, 175 per hour. These lawyers mainly originate from the
'social bar'. Much of the primary legal aid is now provided by Legal
Assistance Centres (Duro's voor Rechtshulp). Here the first 30 minutes of
consultation are free of charge and the next two hours cost Oft. 30.
56. See President of the District Court of Assen, 21 March 1994, NJCM-Bulletin 1995, pp.
28-34. See also District Court of Groningen, 13 February 1996, JB 1996, 179.
57. P. Nicolai, Het nieuwe bestuursprocesrecht [The new procedural administrative law],
VAR Series 112, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1994, p. 131.
58. Gericht verplicht [Report on the necessity of procedural representation], July 1997.
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Thereafter a so-called 'personal contribution' is required. Free legal aid is
given by several law polyclinics, mainly financed by private funds.
The possibility cannot be excluded that the so-called personal contribution
(eigen bijdrage) on the basis of the Legal Aid Act 1993 can form an
impediment to access to justice, especially if the case is one in which legal
aid is required.
Research has shown that since the entry into force of the Legal Aid Act
in 1994 the use of legal aid financed by the government has declined
dramatically. The conclusion is that people with the least financial capacity
generally do not encounter problems in receiving financed legal aid. The
greatest problems are encountered by people with a modal income. On the
basis of the Legal Aid Act they often do not have (or have lost) the right to
financed legal aid. One must fear that in a substantial number of cases many
people from this middle-income group will refrain from lodging an appeal
to the court purely on the ground of financial motives."
3.3.4 Compulsory representation
Persons who lack legal capacity according to national law (minors and
persons subject guardianship) cannot institute civil proceedings themselves;
their legal representative must do this for them.
In Dutch law a minor does not have the possibility of going to court
independently. This restriction is not explicitly stated in the Civil Code, but
can be concluded from Article 1:245, which states that the parents represent
their child in civil matters. If a minor wishes to commence proceedings he
or she is dependent on the goodwill and cooperation of his/her legal
representatives. In case of conflicting interests between a minor and his/her
parents, the child can request the Subdistrict Court to appoint a special
guardian (bijzonder curator), who will then represent the minor: a disguised,
but not autonomous access to the courts. Furthermore, the minor cannot
appeal against a decision of the Subdistrict Court not to appoint a special
guardian.
There are some exceptions to this procedural incapacity of minors. Minors
have sometimes been declared admissible in their claims in summary
proceedings, when the urgency of the case meant that there was not enough
time to wait for the appointment of a special guardian. These cases generally
involved older minors (16, 17 years). In cases of access, children of 12 years
and older have a so-called informal access to the court. The court is not
obliged to do anything as regards such a request and the minor cannot
59. A. Klijn, G. Paulides & J. van der Schaaf, Rechtsbijstand: krimpende markten [Report on
Legal Aid: Shrinking Markets], WODe-report, 1996, see inter alia NJB 1996, p. 1652-
1653.
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independently appeal against the decision of the court. Children aged undeF
12 years only have access to the court in so far as they are able to make a
reasonable evaluation of their interests, in the opinion of the court.
In administrative law minors are in a better procedural position. Article
8:21 GALA provides in paragraph one that natural persons who are not
competent to be a party to litigation shall be represented in the action by
their representatives under civil law. According to paragraph two these
persons may represent themselves in the action if they can be deemed to have
a reasonable understanding of their interests.
It is possible that in the case of a conflict with his/her legal representatives
a minor does not have access to a court. It is questionable if this is in
accordance with Article 6 ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights, from which it is clear that restrictions on the right to access
to a court are permitted as long as the essence of this right is not impaired.
The foregoing also holds true for non-minors who have been placed under
guardianship. The Supreme Court delivered an interesting judgment on the
procedural capacity of a person subject to wardship in summary proceedings
against his guardian. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that a person
placed under guardianship can institute proceedings autonomously when an
immediate decision in summary proceedings is necessary in a conflict with
his guardian about his place of residence. This competence encompasses, in
principle, the right to the necessary legal assistance, in particular immediate,
undisturbed and sufficient contacts with a lawyer. The Supreme Court
considered, inter alia, that the legal provisions on guardianship must be
interpreted in the light of Articles 6 (1) ECHR, 14 (1) ICCPR and 17 and 18
of the Dutch Constitution, in order to provide persons placed under
guardianship with effective access to the court. According to commentator De
Boer, it is also logical to apply this judgment in a conflict between a minor
and his/her parents."
3.3.5 'Pre-trial' proceedings
In .cases concerning administrative action, the basic rule is that disputes can
only be brought before the court after use has been made of the possibility
of lodging a notice of objection with the same body which took the original
decision. This objection procedure has a dual function. Firstly, it offers an
extension to the decision-making process, in the sense that the administrative
body involved is given the opportunity to correct mistakes made in the
original decision-making process and to reconsider the decision in the light
60. Supreme Court, 28 January 1994, NJ 1994 687, annotation by J. de Boer.
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of the objections made. Secondly, it forms the first phase of the process of
legal protection against the administration. The lodging of a notice of
objection does not stand in the way of bringing a case before the courts, as
applications for pre-trial remedies can be made pending the objection
procedure. Furthermore, a notice of objection can be directed against
decisions which are still forthcoming (fictitious refusal), and an administra-
tive appeal can be lodged when a decision in respect of the notice of
objection is still forthcoming.
The notices of objection and of appeal are not very formal in administra-
tive cases: the name and address of the person lodging the objection or
appeal, date, description of the administrative decision concerned and the
grounds for objection or appeal are sufficient. Mistakes may also be corrected
(Articles 6:5 and 6:6 GALA).
Three years after its entry into force the GALA was subjected to a
detailed evaluation. The results were satisfactory in many respects. The new
procedural law functions well in the sense that the bodies exercising
administrative jurisdiction are not hampered in fulfilling their task. The
objection procedure was also found to live up to expectations. It effectively
results in the limitation of the number of disputes brought before the courts.
Nevertheless, the compulsory character of the objection procedure was the
subject of discussion. In particular with regard to decisions in respect of
which very extensive preparation is imperative, doubts have arisen as to the
significance of the objection proeedure, in which every aspect involved is
again weighed. This will often only lead to repetitive action."
3.3.6 Time limits as regards the appeal procedure
In administrative law the period for lodging a notice of objection or appeal
is six weeks. Under certain circumstances the exceeding of this period may
be excused." In relation to particular subjects, there are provisions for
special administrative procedures, which lay down a time schedule that binds
both the party concerned and the courts. Examples can be found in the
legislation which paved the way for the accelerated reinforcement of dikes
along the major rivers." Similar legislation is also being considered in
relation to the expansion of Schiphol national airport."
61. Toepassing en effecten van de Algeniene wet bestuursrecht 1994-1996 [Implementation
and Effects ofthe GALA 1994-1996], Verslag van de commissie Evaluatie Algemene wet
bestuursrecht (Commissie Polak), Den Haag, 1996.
R
62. Articles 6:7-6:12 GALA.
63. The Deltawet Grote Rivieren [Major Rivers Delta Act], 13 April 1995.
64. Nieuwsbrief Ruimtelijke Ordening 1997, nr. 18, p. 2-3.
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Periods for appeal and cassation are also laid down in civil litigation and
criminal proceedings. These periods do not constitute any real limitation to
the right of access to justice.
3.3.7- Funding the judiciary
Funding the judiciary requires attention in relation to the right of access to
justice. The funding of the judiciary forms part of the budget of the Ministry
of Justice. The administration of the judiciary is also in the hands of the
Minister of Justice. No separate organization of the judiciary exists, and
neither does a Magistrates' Council. The funding of the judiciary has become
problematic in recent years, as the increase in the number and complexity of
cases has led to difficulties concerning the capacity of the judiciary which
cannot be solved simply by increasing available funds." This has given rise
to further inquiry into the management of the judiciary."
The judicial organization consists of a collection of courts which cannot
be considered as one single organization. The ordinary courts, which are
competent to decide both criminal and civil disputes, comprise about 60
Subdistrict Courts (individually competent courts), 19 District Courts, 5
Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court situated in The Hague. The
administration ofjustice in administrative disputes is basically assigned to the
District Courts, while several courts can hear appeals. No hierarchical order
exists among all these tribunals. Neither do they form a single unit from an
administrative point of view. At present the judiciary is discussing its future
functioning within the framework of a consultation process entitled
'ZM2000' .67
3.4 Renunciation of the right ofaccess to justice
3.4.1 Arbitration
Under Dutch law parties can contractually provide for the possibility of
having existing or future disputes arising out of a legal relationship between
them decided by arbitrators (Article 1020 (1) Code of Civil Procedure,
hereinafter CCP). This arbitration agreement may not, however, lead to the
65. Recently, the Minister of Justice announced an increase in the budget for the judiciary,
inter alia, with the aim of appointing 100 new judges; see De Volkskrant, 6 November
1997.
66. H. Franken, Onafbankelijk en verantwoordelijk (Independent and Responsible], Deventer,
1997. See also M.FJ.M. de Werd, Rechterlijke organisatie nieuwe stijl [Restyling the
Judicial Organization], NJB 1997, pp. 325-332.
67. Trema 1996, pp. 21-24.
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determination of legal effects which are not subject to the free disposition of
the parties (Article 1020 (3) CCP). The court which is confronted with a
dispute in relation to which an arbitration agreement has been agreed upon
basically has to declare that it has no jurisdiction when the main defence
relates to the existence of the arbitration agreement, unless the agreement is
held to be invalid (Article 1022 (1) CCP).
Nevertheless, an arbitral award can only be enforced by virtue of an order
issued by the President of the District Court at the request of one of the
parties (Article 1062 (1) CCP). The President is competent to refuse the grant
ofan exequatur (enforcement order) when the arbitral award itselfor the way
in which it has been attained have to be considered as being evidently
contrary to good morals or public order (Article 1063 (1) CCP). In case of
such refusal the petitioner can lodge an appeal or commence cassation
proceedings (Article 1063 (3), (4) CCP). When the President does grant an
exequatur the only means of redress open to the petitioner's opponent are
nullification and a petition for (extraordinary) redress" (Article 1062 (4)
CCP). Nullification of the arbitral award will take place when the decision
or the way in which it has been attained represents a violation of public order
or good morals (Article 1065 (1)(e) CCP). This will, for example, be the case
when facts or circumstances have come to light which mean that it has to be
assumed that an arbitrator has factually not been independent or impartial, or
when doubts about his independence or impartiality are such that the
prejudiced party cannot reasonably be expected to accept the arbitral award.
The appearance of dependence or partiality does not constitute a sufficient
ground for nullification." Before delivering of his judgement an arbitrator
can be challenged when there are justified doubts as to his independence and
impartiality (Article 1033 CCP).
Arbitration can also be applied in administrative law, although as yet little
use has been made of it.70
Generally speaking, parties can renounce their right of access to a court
according to Article 6 (1) ECHR. One of the conditions is that this has been
68. Extraordinary means of redress for reviewing/quashing a judgment in a civil case against
which ordinary means of redress are no longer available.
69. Supreme Court, 18 February 1994, NJ 1994, 765.
70. S. Pront-Van Bommel, Bemiddeling, de Vaststellingsovereenkomst en Arbitrage in
Bestuursrechtelijke geschillen [Mediation, Determination Agreements and Arbitration in
Administrative Disputes], in: I.C. van der Vlies & S. Pront-Van Bommel (red.), Van
Toetsing naar Bemiddeling, Deventer, 1997.
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done voluntarily, i.e. without the use of pressure." According to the
European Commission of Human Rights, arbitration has to be governed by
law, and there must also be provision for a certain degree of supervision of
the arbitration procedure by the courts, which will be executed in a particular
case. Arbitration procedures do not, however, need to fulfil all the conditions
of Article 6 ECHR.72 The outline of the Dutch arbitration procedure as set
out above has been judged to be in accordance with Article 6 (1) ECHR.73
3.4.2 Disciplinary law
A distinction can be made between the disciplinary law of various associa-
tions and bodies and the disciplinary law which is regulated by Act of
Parliament.
Any association or foundation is free to adopt in its statutes or regulations
disciplinary measures in order to have the possibility of controlling the
actions of its members. Examples are the Royal Netherlands Medical Society
(Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst),
the Royal Fraternity of Public Notaries (Koninklijke Notariele Broederschap)
and the National Dutch Football Association' (Koninklijke Nederlandse
Voetbal Bond, KNVB). According to the statutes of the KNVB, a professional
footballer cannot institute proceedings before a civil court, but he is subject
to the jurisdiction of the of the KNVB disciplinary tribunal.
According to Leijten it is questionable whether Article 6 ECHR is
applicable to the disciplinary law ofassociations, because the ECHR imposes
obligations primarily on states and not on associations. The Dutch courts
consider a disciplinary decision to be a binding third party ruling, against
which appeal is possible to an independent court, namely the court in civil
matters.74
Disciplinary law regulated by Act of Parliament finds its basis in Article
113 (2) of the Constitution, which reads: 'Disciplinary proceedings establis-
hed by government bodies shall be regulated by Act of Parliament'.
Examples are military and medical disciplinary law. According to the
European Court of Human Rights, disciplinary proceedings do not in
71. European Court of Human Rights, 27 February 1980, Deweer v. Belgium, Series A, vol.
35, § 49.
72. European Commission of Human Rights, 27 November 1996, Nordstrom v. The
Netherlands, (report), NJ 1997, 505; Strasbourg sequel to Supreme Court, 18 February
1994, NJ 1994, 765.
73. European Commission of Human Rights, 27 November 1996, Nordstrom v. The
Netherlands, (report), NJ 1997, 505.
74. MJ.C. Leijten, Tuchtrecht getoetst [Disciplinary Law put to the test], dissertation Tilburg,
1991, pp. 32-33.
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principle concern the 'contestation of civil rights or obligations' or a
'criminal charge' in the sense of Article 6 ECHR. However, the Court
examines on a case-by-case basis whether Article 6 is applicable in the
relevant disciplinary proceedings. The Court has applied the guarantees of
Article 6 in military and medical disciplinary proceedings."
It can be concluded that disciplinary proceedings regulated by Act of
Parliament must fulfil the conditions of Article 6 ECHR. If this is not the
case, an appeal must be possible to an independent court, that is the court in
civil matters. The Supreme Court has ruled in some judgments that the
Medical Disciplinary Tribunal had not respected all the guarantees of Article
6 ECHR.76
3.5 Criminal law
In criminal law, access to justice on the part of an accused is primarily
guaranteed in a negative manner: his position is mainly passive. Persons who
lack legal capacity according to civil law can be subjected to criminal
proceedings. However, the subjects of criminal proceedings do not only have
a passive role, namely when there is a possibility of objecting against a
default judgment, an appeal or cassation." For accused minors a restriction
applies: if they are under 16 years of age, only their lawyer can resort to
means of redress (Article 503 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure).
Apart from this regular administration ofjustice, more and more forms of
'consensual settlement' are developing. An important form of consensual
settlement is the out-of-court settlement by the Public Prosecutor. In this case
the suspect gives up his right of access to a court. There are also experiments
with effecting a compromise (dading) in which compensation of the victim
is the primary goal. The victim's access to criminal justice is restrictively
regulated. The victim can be enjoined in the criminal proceedings as a civil
party, but it is not at all certain whether he will be compensated for his
(entire) damage. The victim will often be compelled to seek redress in the
civil court with an action arising out of tort (Article 6:162 of the Civil Code)
in order to have his damage fully compensated. However, there are the
above-mentioned experiments with effecting a compromise based on the idea
of concluding an agreement between the offender and the victim in order to
expeditiously compensate the victim for his damage.
75. Leijten 1991, p. 164.
See Supreme Court, 3 March 1995, NJ 1995.
Brenninkmeijer 1987, p. 103.
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When the Public Prosecutor decides not to prosecute the suspect, for
example because the reasonable time required by Article 6 ECHR has
elapsed, the victim can file a complaint to the Court of Appeal on the basis
of Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in order to effect the
prosecution of the suspect. However, the victim cannot appeal against a
rejection of the request by the Court of Appeal. There are some recent cases
in which the Supreme Court has considered the procedure based on Article
12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be surrounded by sufficient
safeguards. As a consequence, an appeal to the civil courts on the ground that
the government has committed a tort (Article 6:162 Civil Code) by not
prosecuting the persons who have committed a crime against it, is not
admissible."
3.6 Length ofproceedings
In the Netherlands the length of proceedings has received a great deal of
attention. In criminal cases this attention/ results from the guarantees
formulated by the European Court of Human Rights. In civil and administra-
tive proceedings the applicable time-limits do not often lead to a finding that
Article 6 ECHR has been violated. However, in the Netherlands it is not self-
evident that proceedings should be conducted within a reasonable period of
time. In administrative law, an influential factor is that the length of the
proceedings directly affects the legal security of the acts of the administra-
tion. Extremely lengthy proceedings can have negative effects on society. In
civil cases the length of proceedings largely affects one or both of the parties
and will increase legal costs for example.
No systematic inventory has up to now been made of the length of
proceedings in civil and administrative matters. In the first instance,
proceedings generally last for one year; on appeal, periods of one or two
years are not uncommon. In practice, summary proceedings based on Article
289 of the Code Civil Procedure and Article 8:81 GALA playa very
important part in reducing the length of the proceedings. Summary procee-
dings in administrative law are only possible when the procedure on the
merits has been initiated. This so-called 'connexity' does not form an
impediment for parties to obtain a provisional decision or order from the
administrative courts within a few weeks or, if necessary, within one week.
Summary proceedings in civil matters form an autonomous procedural
possibility and in many disputes only summary proceedings are conducted.
78. See the judgments of the Supreme Court of 10 October 1997, RvdW 1997, 194C and
195C.
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The President of the District Court gives his provisional opinion on the
merits of the case or grants a provisional order. The length of summary
proceedings can be very short: one week is not exceptional. Summary
proceedings aimed at the collection of debts, together with the possibility of
default in proceedings in which the other party does not appear, constitute an
effective answer to the need for more rapid administration ofjustice in cases
of financial claims.
In civil proceedings lawyers and judges are at present working together
on experiments designed to accelerate proceedings. Alternatives are also
being developed for the administration ofjustice by the state. Some forms of
binding third party advice have been introduced in consumer disputes.
Certain branches can offer a standard procedure for the settlement of
disputes, upon condition that their general standards have been examined as
to their reasonableness. This examination provides an important preventive
effect.
In certain areas of society, arbitration plays an important part. Further-
more, increasing attention is being given to mediation as an alternative for
the administration of justice by the state. In the field of divorce, it has been
proposed that divorce should be made possible without the intervention of a
court.
4 Conclusion
Since the right of access to justice has not as such been embedded in the
Dutch Constitution, Article 6 ECHR and case-law on this matter have a key
role to play in ensuring the right of access to justice in the Dutch legal order.
This provision has binding force in the Dutch legal order. Several decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights have led to changes in the judicial
organization and in procedural law and its application. In 1992 a process of
revising the judicial organization was set in motion, partly as a result of
Strasbourg case-law on Article 6 ECHR. The case-law of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities on the right to effective legal protection is also
of increasing significance to the Dutch legal order.
The Constitution provides the basis for the judicial organization and the
attribution of jurisdiction to impartial courts, as it incorporates a number of
basic assumptions, such as the appointment for life of the individual judges
and the jurisdiction of the criminal and civil courts. However, 'organic' laws
and procedural laws are the most significant in ensuring the right of access
to justice in the Dutch legal order.
Current issues being discussed with regard to the administration ofjustice
concern, among other things, the funding and management of the judicial








organization, the speed and costs of proceedings and the possible alternatives
to the administration ofjustice in the ordinary courts. A considerable number
of people are precluded from bringing a dispute before the courts, particular-
ly because of the contribution they have to pay by virtue of the Legal Aid
Act.
Broadly speaking, it can be concluded that, from a formal point of view,
the right of access to justice is sufficiently ensured in the Dutch legal order.
In legal practice, however, difficulties in gaining access to justice are
nevertheless encountered in the Netherlands.
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